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The word “auction” generally refers to a mechanism for allocating one or more resources to one
or more parties (or bidders). Generally, once the allocation is determined, some amount of money
changeshands;theprecisemonetarytransfersaredeterminedbytheauctionprocess.Whileinsome
auction protocols, such as the English auction, bidders repeatedly increase their bids in an attempt
tooutbideach other,thisisnotanessentialcomponentofanauction.Therearemanyotherauction
protocols, and we will study some of them in this chapter.
Auctions have traditionally been studied mostly by economists. In recent years, computer scien-
tists have also become interested in auctions, for a variety of reasons. Auctions can be useful for
allocatingvariouscomputingresourcesacrossusers.Inartiﬁcialintelligence,theycanbeusedtoallo-
cate resources and tasks across multiple artiﬁcially intelligent “agents.” Auctions are also important
in electronic commerce: there are of course several well-known auction Web sites, but additionally,
search engines use auctions to sell advertising space on their results pages. Finally, increased com-
puting power and improved algorithms have made new types of auctions possible—most notably
combinatorial auctions, in which multiple items are for sale in the same auction, and bidders can
bid on bundles of items.
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We begin this chapter by studying single-item auctions. Even though most computer scientists
are perhaps more interested in combinatorial auctions, single-item auctions allow us to more easily
introduce certain concepts that are also of key importance in combinatorial auctions.
16.1 Standard Single-Item Auction Protocols
Inthissection,wereviewsomebasicprotocolsforauctioningasingleitem.Thereaderisencouraged
tothinkaboutwhichoftheseprotocolsaresimilartoeachother;wewilldiscussrelationshipsamong
them shortly.
English.TheEnglishauctionisthemostfamiliarprotocoltomostpeople.InanEnglishauction,every
bidderisallowedtoplaceabidhigherthanthecurrenthighestbid.Ifatsomepoint,nobidderwishes
to place a higher bid, then the bidder with the current highest bid wins the item, and pays her bid.
Dutch. The Dutch auction proceeds in the opposite direction from the English auction. In a Dutch
auction, an initial price is set that is very high, after which the price is gradually decreased. At any
moment, any bidder can claim the item. She then wins the item and has to pay the current price.
Japanese.InaJapaneseauction,theinitialpriceiszero;thepriceisthengraduallyincreased.Abidder
canleavetheroomwhenthepricebecomestoohighforher.Oncethereisonlyonebidderremaining,
that bidder wins the item, and pays the price at which the last other bidder left the room.
First-pricesealed-bid. In a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction, each bidder communicates a bid privately
to the auctioneer—say, in a sealed envelope. The auctioneer then opens all the envelopes; the bidder
with the highest bid wins the item, and pays the bid that she placed.
Second-price sealed-bid (also known as Vickrey). The second-price sealed-bid auction proceeds
exactly as the ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction, except the highest bidder (who still wins the item) now
pays the second-highest bid, instead of her own.
Let us consider which of these auction protocols are similar to each other. Perhaps the most
obvious similarity is between the English and the Japanese auctions. For both, there is a price that
is rising, and the last remaining bidder wins. There is a distinction, however: in an English auction,
two bidders may be bidding each other up, while a third bidder quietly sits by, even though she
remains interested in the item. In this case, the ﬁrst two bidders are unaware that they have another
competitor. In a Japanese auction, this situation cannot occur.
The Japanese auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction are also closely related (and the
English auction is related to the second-price sealed-bid auction in a similar way). Suppose, for a
second, that each bidder in a Japanese auction decides at the beginning of the auction on the price
at which she will leave the room. Of course, other strategies are possible: a bidder may base how
long she stays in the room on which other bidders are still left. However, if the bidders follow the
former kind of strategy, then the bidder who, at the beginning, chose the highest price will end up
winning, and she will end up paying the second-highest price selected by a bidder—similarly to the
second-price sealed-bid auction.
TheDutchauctionandtheﬁrst-pricesealed-bidauctionareevenmorecloselyrelated.Similarlyto
theJapanese auction,in aDutchauction,a bidder maydecide atthebeginningonthe price atwhich
shewillclaimtheitem(ifthispriceisreached).Infact,unlikeintheJapaneseauction,thereislittleelse
thatabiddercandointermsofstrategizing.InaJapaneseauction,abiddercanletherbiddingstrategy
dependonwhoelseisleft;butinaDutchauction,thereisnothingtoconditionherstrategyon,since
the only event that can happen is that someone else claims the item—but at that point the auction is
over and it no longer matters what anyone does. Now, the bidder who chooses the highest price will
win, and pay that price—similarly to the ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction. Because of this argument,
the Dutch and ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auctions are usually considered strategically equivalent.
We will see some other single-item auctions later in this chapter. For most of this chapter,
we will focus on sealed-bid auctions. As we have seen, for each of the auctions studied so far,Atallah/Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook: Second Edition C820X_C016 Revises Page 3 2009-8-28
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there is a roughly equivalent sealed-bid auction; in a sense, this is true for any auction, as we will
see shortly. Nevertheless, there are reasons to use English, Japanese, and Dutch auctions (more
generally, ascending and descending auctions). One reason is that they allow bidders to postpone
certaindecisionsuntillater.Forexample,ifabidderinaDutchauctionisdecidingwhethertoclaim
the item at $60 or $50, she may as well wait until the price drops to, say, $70, before she starts to
think about what she will do. If another bidder claims the item before that, the former bidder will
have saved herself some unnecessary agonizing. This is related to preference elicitation, which we
will discuss toward the end of this chapter.
16.2 Valuations and Utilities
How a bidder should bid in an auction depends on how much the item for sale is worth to her. In
this chapter, we will assume that each bidder can determine how much the item is worth to her, and
that events in the auction will not change her assessment. That is, each bidder i has an unchanging
valuation vi for the item, which she can determine at the beginning of the auction. This assumption
is not always realistic. For example, if a bidder sees that other bidders are bidding aggressively on an
item,thismaybeevidencetoherthat,beforetheauction,thosebiddersinspectedtheiteminperson
and found it to be of good quality. This evidence may improve the ﬁrst bidder’s perception of—and
hence, valuation for—the item. Settings such as these, where some bidders have private information
thatwouldaﬀectthevaluationofotherbiddersfortheitem,areknownasinterdependentvaluations
settings. Most research assumes away the possibility of interdependent valuations, and we will do so
in this chapter.
In general, each bidder has a utility for each outcome of the auction, and acts to maximize her
expected utility. We will assume that a bidder’s utility for winning the item and having to pay πi is
ui =vi − πi, and her utility for not winning the item and having to pay πi is ui =−πi. (Generally,
losingbidderswillnotbemadetopayanything;however,laterinthischapter,wewillseeanauction
that makes payments to losing bidders, in which case πi is negative.) Thus, we are assuming that
a bidder’s utility function decomposes into separate valuation and payment components, and that
utility is linear in money. This assumption is known as the quasilinear preferences assumption.
It,too,isnotalwaysrealistic,forthefollowingreasons.Ingeneral,one’sutilitymaybestrictlyconcave
inmoney(thatis,onemayhavedecreasingmarginalutilityformoney:theutilityofhavinganother
(say) dollar may decrease as one accumulates more money), since at some point one runs out of
uses for money. Also, in general, the eﬀect of money on utility may depend on whether one has won
the item: for example, if a bidder wins a pair of skis in an auction, she needs money to travel on a
skiing vacation (and hence has high marginal utility for money), whereas if she does not win, she
has less use for additional money (and hence has low marginal utility for money). Nevertheless, the
quasilinearity assumption is usually made, and we will do so in this chapter.
Another assumption that is implicit in the above text is that a bidder who does not win the item
doesnotcareaboutwhichotherbidder winstheitem,andthatbidders donotcareabouthowmuch
other bidders pay. This assumption is known as the no externalities assumption. Once again, this
assumption is not always realistic: a bidder may prefer to see the item end up with a friend rather
than with an enemy, or she may prefer to see the other bidders run out of money so that they will
not compete in future auctions. Again, we will not go into detail on this in this chapter.
16.3 Strategic Bidding
It does not always make sense for a bidder to simply bid her true valuation. For example, if bidder
i bids her true valuation vi in a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction, then even if she wins, her utility willAtallah/Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook: Second Edition C820X_C016 Revises Page 4 2009-8-28
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be vi − πi =vi − vi =0. Hence, she should bid lower than her true valuation to have any chance of
obtaining positive utility. But how much lower should she bid? Intuitively, this should depend on
her beliefs about the other bidders’ valuations. If she expects to be the only bidder who is seriously
interestedinobtainingtheitem,shecanplacealowbidandstillprobablywin;whereasifsheexpects
there to be many other competitive bidders, she should bid closer to her true valuation to have a
decent chance of winning. However, it is not obvious how to calculate her optimal bid precisely,
even given a probability distribution over the others’ valuations. This is because she cannot expect
theotherbidderstobidtheirtruevaluations,either:theyalsoneedtobidbelowtheirtruevaluations
to have a chance of obtaining positive utility. And precisely how much lower is optimal for them to
bid depends, in turn, on how the ﬁrst bidder bids.
16.3.1 Solving the First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
To resolve this circularity, we need to turn to game theory, which studies settings in which each
bidder’s (or, more generally, agent’s) optimal course of action depends on the actions of the other
bidders. To apply game theory to the ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction, we ﬁrst need to introduce the
concept of a strategy. In a sealed-bid auction, a strategy for bidder i is a function si : R≥0 → R≥0,
where si(vi) is the bid that i will place if her true valuation is vi.T h a ti s ,f o revery valuation that the
bidder may have, the strategy speciﬁes what she should bid. This may appear somewhat excessive: if
the bidder already knows her true valuation, why should she have to specify what she would have
bid if her valuation had been diﬀerent? The reason that we need to think about this is that the other
bidders do not know bidder i’s valuation, and they need to think about what i would do for each
valuation.Inturn,bidderineedstothinkaboutwhattheotherbidderswilldo,andhencealsoneeds
to think about what they think she will do.
Let us suppose that for each bidder i, there is a (commonly known) prior probability distribution
pi over her valuation vi; moreover, let us assume that the valuations are drawn independently.
Hence, each bidder i knows her own valuation vi exactly, but for every other bidder j  = i, i’s
probability distribution over j’s valuation is pj.N o w ,if bidder i knows the strategies of the other
bidders, then for every bid that she might place, she can evaluate her expected utility; and of course
she should choose one that maximizes her expected utility. As is typically done in game theory,
we will look for an equilibrium, which prescribes a strategy for every bidder such that, for every
bidder, for every possible valuation for that bidder, her strategy will prescribe a bid that maximizes
her expected utility, given the other strategies. Formally, a Bayes–Nash equilibrium consists of a
strategy si : R≥0 → R≥0 for every bidder such that, for every bidder i, for every vi ∈ R≥0,a n df o r
every alternative bid ˆ vi ∈ R≥0:

v−i
⎛
⎝
 
j =i
pj(vj)
⎞
⎠ui(vi,s−i(v−i),si(vi))dv−i ≥

v−i
⎛
⎝
 
j =i
pj(vj)
⎞
⎠ui(vi,s−i(v−i), ˆ vi)dv−i
Let us dissect this complicated inequality. First, the notation −i is shorthand for “the bidders other
than i,” so that v−i is shorthand for v1,...,vi−1,vi+1,...,vn. The notation ˆ vi is generally used for
bidder i’s bid, not necessarily equal to her true valuation vi. ui(vi, ˆ v−i, ˆ vi) is the utility that bidder
i obtains if her true valuation is vi,b u ts h eb i dˆ vi, and the other bidders bid ˆ v−i. In the ﬁrst-price
sealed-bid auction, ui(vi, ˆ v−i, ˆ vi)=vi − ˆ vi if ˆ vi is higher than all the bids in ˆ v−i, and it is 0 otherwise.
Now we can see that the inequality says that, if the bidders other than i follow their strategies, then
i’s expected utility for bidding si(vi) should be at least equal to her expected utility for bidding any
other ˆ vi—that is, she should not be able to do better by not following the strategy si, given that the
other bidders are indeed following their strategies s−i.
We will now give an example of an equilibrium. Suppose that each pi is a uniform distribution
over [0,1]. We will show that the strategies deﬁned by si(vi)=vi(n − 1)/n (where n is the numberAtallah/Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook: Second Edition C820X_C016 Revises Page 5 2009-8-28
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of bidders) constitute an equilibrium. (We will not get into detail here on how one might have
actually derived these strategies, but there are techniques for doing so.) Suppose that all other
bidders (−i) indeed follow these strategies. Then, the expected utility for i of bidding ˆ vi ≤ (n−1)/n
is (ˆ vin/(n − 1))n−1(vi − ˆ vi), because the probability that a given other bidder bids less than ˆ vi is
ˆ vin/(n − 1). (There is no reason to bid more than (n − 1)/n, because no other bidder will bid more
than (n − 1)/n.) Using simple calculus, one can check that this expression is maximized by setting
ˆ vi equal to vi(n − 1)/n—exactly as the strategy prescribes! This proves that these strategies indeed
constitute an equilibrium.
16.3.2 Solving the Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
Now, let us turn to the second-price sealed-bid auction. As it turns out, the analysis needed to
solve this auction is not nearly as complicated. In fact, in the second-price sealed-bid auction, it
is always optimal for a bidder to bid her true valuation, regardless of the other bids! That is, the
strategy si(vi)=vi is a dominant strategy. While this may come as a surprise at ﬁrst, it is not so
diﬃcult to see why it is true. Suppose, for a second, that bidder i can actually see the others’ bids
before placing her own bid. Let us consider the value ˆ vmax, the highest bid among the other bidders.
Bidder i eﬀectively has only two choices: to bid higher than ˆ vmax, and obtain utility vi − ˆ vmax;
or to bid lower than ˆ vmax, and obtain utility 0. Clearly, she should do the former if and only if
vi > ˆ vmax. But this is exactly what would happen if she just bid her true valuation—for which she
does not even need to know the others’ bids! Hence, by bidding her true valuation, she performs
as well as she could have performed even if she had known the others’ bids. This implies that
bidding truthfully is also a Bayes–Nash equilibrium, although the result is much stronger than
that. For example, in the ﬁrst-price auction, if one knows the bids of the other bidders, then
certainly one might be better oﬀ bidding diﬀerently from the equilibrium that we derived for that
auction (which we derived under the assumption that bidders do not know each other’s valuations).
Hence,thestrategiesintheﬁrst-priceauctionequilibriumarenotdominantstrategies.Mechanisms
in which revealing one’s true valuation is a dominant strategy (such as the second-price sealed-
b i da u c t i o n )a r ec a l l e d( dominant-strategies) incentive compatible, strategy-proof, or simply
truthful.
16.4 Revenue Equivalence
Now that we have analyzed how bidders should bid in these two auctions, let us ask the following
question: which one obtains more revenue for the seller, in expectation? The answer is not immedi-
atelyobvious:naïvely,onemightsaythattheﬁrst-priceauctionshouldresultinmorerevenue,since
after all it charges the highest bid rather than the second-highest; but then again, in equilibrium, the
bids are lower in the ﬁrst-price auction. Which of these two eﬀects is stronger?
For the case of independent uniform priors over [0,1], we can compute the expected revenues
using the equilibrium strategies from above text. For the ﬁrst-price auction, the probability that all
bids are below a given value b is (bn/(n−1))n, which is also the probability that the revenue will be
belowb.Thatis,thisexpressiongivesthecumulativedensityfunctionoftherevenueoftheﬁrst-price
auction,andusingitonecancomputetheexpectedrevenuetobe(n−1)/(n+1).Forthesecond-price
auction,theprobabilitythatthereisatmostonebidhigherthanbisbn+nbn−1(1−b),whichisalso
the probability that the revenue will be below b. That is, this expression gives the cumulative density
function of the revenue of the second-price auction, and using it one can compute the expected
revenue to be (n−1)/(n+1)—the same as that for the ﬁrst-price auction! This is no accident: it is a
special case of the following result, which is known as the revenue equivalence theorem (Myerson,
1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981).Atallah/Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook: Second Edition C820X_C016 Revises Page 6 2009-8-28
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THEOREM 16.1 Suppose that the bidders’ valuations are independent and identically distributed
over a continuous interval [L,H], and that there are no “gaps” in this distribution. Then, any two
auction mechanisms that
1. in equilibrium always allocate the item to the bidder with the highest valuation, and
2. give a bidder with valuation L an expected utility of 0,
will result in the same expected revenue for the seller.
(There are more general versions of this result.) In the next section, we will see single-item auction
mechanismsthatresultindiﬀerentexpectedrevenues,becausetheyviolateoneofthetwoconditions
in the theorem. From this point on, we will study only truthful mechanisms. This is justiﬁed by a
result known as the revelation principle (Gibbard, 1973; Green and Laﬀont, 1977; Myerson, 1979,
1981), which states (roughly) that, if bidders bid strategically, then for every mechanism that is not
a truthful mechanism, there is a truthful mechanism that performs equally well.
16.5 Auctions with Different Revenues
Suppose that we have a prior distribution over each bidder’s valuation, and that we wish to design
a mechanism that maximizes expected revenue. It is easy to see that running, say, a second-price
sealed-bidauctionisnotalwaysoptimal.Forexample,supposethereisonlyonebidder.Thesecond-
pricesealed-bidauctionwillnevercollectanyrevenueinthiscase,becausethereisnosecondbidder.
However, we can also make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the one bidder: the bidder will obtain the
item if and only if it is worth more than some ﬁxed value k to her, in which case she will pay k;
otherwise, the seller keeps the item. This willgenerate a revenue of k atleast some ofthe time.While
this may not seem like an auction, setting a reserve price of k in a second-price sealed-bid auction
will have the same eﬀect. (In such an auction, if only one bid is above the reserve price, then that bid
pays the reserve price.)
Ingeneral,theauctionthatmaximizesexpectedrevenueisknownastheMyersonauction(Myer-
son, 1981), and it proceeds as follows. For each bidder i, compute her virtual valuation ψi(ˆ vi) as a
function of her bid, as follows:
ψi(ˆ vi)= ˆ vi − (1 − Fi(ˆ vi))/fi(ˆ vi)
Here, Fi is the cumulative density function of i’s valuation, and fi is its derivative, the probability
density function. The bidder with the highest virtual valuation wins, unless this bidder has a virtual
valuation below 0, in which case nobody wins. The price that the winning bidder pays is the lowest
valuethatshecouldhavebidwhilestillwinning.Forexample,ifeachbidder’svaluationisdrawnfrom
the uniform distribution over [0,1], then the Myerson auction becomes a second-price sealed-bid
auction with a reserve price of 1/2. This is because
ψi(1/2) = 1/2 − (1 − Fi(1/2))/fi(1/2) = 1/2 − (1 − 1/2)/1 = 0
It does not always make sense to try to maximize expected revenue. In some settings, our main
goal is to allocate the item eﬃciently (that is, to the bidder that values it most), and payments are
merely a necessary nuisance in achieving this goal. For example, suppose that several parties jointly
ownanitem,andtheywishtorunanauctionamongstthemselvestodecideonasingleowner.What
should happen to the revenue of this auction? It seems to make sense to redistribute it back to the
bidders themselves, but doing so eﬀectively changes the auction mechanism. For example, suppose
thatthebiddersrunasecond-pricesealed-bidauctionfortheitem,andthenredistributetherevenue
of this auction equally (each bidder receives 1/n of the revenue). Unlike the second-price sealed-bidAtallah/Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook: Second Edition C820X_C016 Revises Page 7 2009-8-28
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auction without redistribution, this auction is actually not truthful: the second-highest bidder now
has an incentive to increase her bid to drive up the price that the highest bidder pays, because the
second-highest bidder will receive a fraction of this price.
Fortunately, it turns out that we can redistribute at least some of the revenue while maintaining
truthfulness.Oneauctionmechanismthatachievesthisisthefollowing[independentlyinventedon
at least three diﬀerent occasions (Bailey, 1997; Porter et al., 2004; Cavallo, 2006)]. Let us deﬁne v2
−i
to be the second-highest bid among bidders other than bidder i. For the top two bidders, this is the
third-highest bid overall (v3); for the remaining n − 2 bidders, it is the second-highest bid (v2). We
run the second-price sealed-bid auction, and we redistribute v2
−i/n to bidder i. This redistribution
payment does not aﬀect bidders’ incentives in bidding, because no bidder can aﬀect her own
redistribution payment. Hence, the auction remains truthful. Additionally, the total redistributed
is 2v3/n + (n − 2)v2/n ≤ v2—so the total redistributed is no more than is collected from the
second-price sealed-bid auction. A total of 2(v2 − v3)/n is not redistributed. This money must be
given to someone else (but not someone whom the bidders care about, since that might aﬀect their
incentives), or, say, burned. It is impossible to achieve eﬃcient allocation without ever wasting any
money, but it is possible to waste even less money (either on average or in the worst case): this is
achieved by also letting bidder i’s redistribution payment depend on v3
−i,v4
−i,...,vn−1
−i (Guo and
Conitzer, 2007; Moulin, 2007).
It is interesting to note that the revenue equivalence theorem from above text does not apply to
Myerson’s auction because the ﬁrst condition is not satisﬁed; it does not apply to the redistribution
mechanisms because the second condition is not satisﬁed.
16.6 Complementarity and Substitutability
Now that we have studied single-item auctions, let us consider settings where multiple items are
for sale. One possibility is to sell each item in a separate single-item auction; these auctions can be
heldsimultaneously(parallelauctions)orback-to-back(sequentialauctions).If,foreachitem,each
bidder’s valuation for that item does not depend on which other items she wins, then the individual
auctions are entirely separate events, and we can apply the techniques that we have studied up to
this point. However, this is not always a realistic assumption. For example, if the items for sale are
a plane ticket to Las Vegas and a hotel reservation in Las Vegas, then it may be that the bidder’s
valuation for the plane ticket alone is 200, her valuation for the hotel reservation alone is 100, but
her valuation for both together is 500. The package of both items is worth more than the sum of its
parts, that is, the items are complementary.
Now suppose that the plane ticket is auctioned ﬁrst, and the hotel reservation second (both in
second-price sealed-bid auctions). How much should the bidder bid in the ﬁrst auction? If she bids
200 for the ticket, she may lose to a bidder bidding 201, only to later ﬁnd out she could have won
the hotel reservation for 101, so that she regrets not bidding higher in the ﬁrst auction. However,
if she bids 400 for the ticket, she may win it at a price of 399, only to later ﬁnd out that the hotel
reservationsellsfor1000,sothatsheregretswinningtheticket.Itisnotclearwhatthebiddershould
do—she no longer has a dominant strategy. Moreover, the resulting allocation of items can be
ineﬃcient.
Anotherpossibilityisthatthepackageofitemsisworthlessthanthesumofitsparts,inwhichcase
theitemsaresaidtobesubstitutable.Forexample,ifreservationsfortwodiﬀerenthotelsareforsale,
a bidder may value each individual reservation at 100, but the package of both reservations at 150.
In sequential auctions, substitutability can cause problems similar to those caused by complemen-
tarity. Both can also cause similar problems in parallel auctions.
Instead ofmakingthebiddersagonizeoverthepricesatwhichitemsinfutureorparallelauctions
are likely to sell, an alternative is to let each bidder report all her valuations, one for each subset ofAtallah/Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook: Second Edition C820X_C016 Revises Page 8 2009-8-28
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the items, and decide on the allocation of items to bidders based on that information. This is what
is done in a combinatorial auction, and it circumvents the problems that parallel and sequential
auctions run into when there are complementarities and substitutabilities.
16.7 Combinatorial Auctions
Inacombinatorialauction,asetI ofmultipleitemsis(simultaneously)forsale,andbidderscanbid
on any bundle (that is, subset) of items. If we again make the assumptions that bidders’ valuations
fortheitemsdonotchangebasedonotherbidders’privateinformation,utilitiesarequasilinear,and
there are no externalities, then each bidder i has a privately held valuation function vi :2 I → R≥0,
where vi(S) is i’s valuation for bundle S ⊆ I; and the utility of bidder i when she wins bundle S
and pays πi is vi(S) − πi. Generally it is assumed that vi(∅)=0, and additionally that for S ⊆ S ,
vi(S) ≤ vi(S ). (The latter assumption is often called free disposal: receiving additional items can
never decrease a bidder’s valuation, because at worst the additional items can simply be discarded.)
We will start by looking at sealed-bid combinatorial auctions. An immediate problem with this
approach is that in general, each bidder must reveal 2m − 1 real numbers (where m=|I|), one for
eachnonemptybundle.Oncemgetstobesomewhatlarge,thisbecomesimpractical.However,there
is usually some structure in the bidders’ valuation functions, so that they can be represented more
concisely.
One very restrictive, but commonly studied assumption about this structure is that bidders are
single-minded. A bidder i is single-minded if there exists some bundle Si and some real number vi
such that vi(S)=vi if Si ⊆ S,a n dvi(S)=0 otherwise. That is, there is a single bundle of items that
the bidder wishes to obtain; she will simply discard any additional items, and if she fails to obtain
evenoneitemwithinherdesiredbundle,hervaluationdropsto0.Ifbiddersaresingle-minded,then
a bid can be represented simply as an ordered pair (Si,vi) ∈ 2I × R≥0.
A single-minded bid cannot represent even fairly straightforward valuation functions, such as
additivevaluationfunctions.(Avaluationfunctionvi isadditiveifforallS ⊆ I,vi(S)=
 
s∈S vi({s}).
That is, there are no complementarities or substitutabilities.) We would like to give bidders some
more ﬂexibility, by providing them with a richer bidding language in which to describe their
valuationfunction.OnesuchbiddinglanguageistheORlanguage,whicheﬀectivelyallowsabidder
to submit multiple single-minded bids. Formally, a bid in the OR language takes the form (S1,v1)
OR (S2,v2) OR ...OR (Sk,vk). Such a bid is interpreted as follows: for any subset T ⊆{ 1,...,k}
with the property that for any j1,j2 ∈ T,j1  = j2, we have Sj1 ∩ Sj2 =∅, vi(
 
j∈T Sj)=
 
j∈T vj.T h a t
is, the auctioneer can accept any subcollection of the single-minded bids within the OR-bid, as long
asthereisnooverlapbetweentheacceptedSj.(Tobeprecise,thelast = symbolshouldreallybea≥
symbol,becauseitispossiblethatthesameset
 
j∈T Sj (orasubsetthereof)canbewrittenasaunion
ofdisjointSj inadiﬀerentwaythatresultsinagreatersumofvj.Thebidder’svaluationforthesubset
isthemaximumvaluethatcanbeobtainedinthisway.Hence,equalityholdsonlyifthereisnobetter
waytowritethebundleasaunionofdisjointSj.Forexample,giventhebid({A},1)OR({A,B},3)OR
({B,C},3) OR ({C},2), we have vi({A,B,C})=vi({A,B}) + vi({C})=5 > 4=vi({A}) + vi({B,C}).)
The OR language allows for representing additive valuations, simply by OR-ing together singleton
bundles.
Nevertheless, there are valuation functions that the OR language cannot capture. For exam-
ple, suppose there are two items, a and b, and that bidder i’s valuation function is given by
vi({a})=1,vi({b})=1,vi({a,b})=1. That is, she wants either item, and having both items is no
more useful to her than having a single one. This function cannot be represented in the OR lan-
guage: the bid would have to contain the terms ({a},1) and ({b},1), but this would already imply
that vi({a,b}) ≥ 2. A language that can capture this valuation function is the XOR language.T h e
diﬀerence between the OR and XOR languages is that the auctioneer can accept at most one of theAtallah/Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook: Second Edition C820X_C016 Revises Page 9 2009-8-28
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single-minded bids that are XORed together, even if they do not overlap. For example, the above
valuation function is easily expressed as ({a},1) XOR ({b},1): this bid implies a valuation of only
1f o rt h eb u n d l e{a,b}, since it is not possible to accept both single-minded bids in the bid. Using
XORs, we can in fact represent any valuation function, by using a single-minded bid for every
possible bundle and XOR-ing them all together. Of course, this is not a very concise representation.
Unfortunately, even representing additive valuation functions can require exponentially long bids
if we use only XORs. But it is also possible to use ORs and XORs simultaneously, to get the best of
both worlds. For example, the bid (({a},1) XOR ({b},1)) OR ({c},2) indicates a value of 1 + 2=3
for the bundle {a,b,c}. There are other bidding languages that are not based on ORs and XORs, but
we will not discuss them in this chapter.
16.8 The Winner Determination Problem
Now that we have considered how to bid in a (sealed-bid) combinatorial auction, we must consider
howtodeterminewhowinswhat.Ofcourse,wecannotawardasingleitemtotwodiﬀerentbidders.
But this still leaves plenty of options. One natural approach is to maximize eﬃciency, the total value
generated. That is, if Si is the bundle of items that we award to bidder i,t h e nw es h o u l dm a x i m i z e  n
i=1 ˆ vi(Si)(undertheconstraintthatSi ∩Sj =∅foralli  = j).Thisoptimizationproblemisknown
as the winner determination problem (WDP).
As it turns out, the WDP is computationallyhard. Even if we consider the special case where each
bidder submits a single-minded bid, the problem turns out to be equivalent to WEIGHTED-SET-
PACKING,whichisNP-hard(Rothkopfetal.,1998)andinapproximable(Sandholm,2002).Onthe
other hand, the problem does not become any harder if we allow bidders to use ORs, since a bidder
using ORs is eﬀectively submitting multiple single-minded bids. In fact, even if we allow XORs, the
problem in a sense becomes no harder: this is because, for the purpose of solving the WDP, we can
transform an instance with XORs into one with only ORs using the following trick (Fujishima et al.,
1999; Nisan, 2000). Given a bid of the form (S1,v1) XOR (S2,v2),w ec r e a t ean e w“ d u m m y ”i t e m ,
d, and replace the bid by (S1 ∪{ d},v1) OR (S2 ∪{ d},v2). Even though there is an OR between these
two bids, they cannot both be accepted, since they have an item in common; moreover, since no
other bids mention this item, everything else remains unaﬀected. Because of this, in the next two
subsections, we will focus on algorithms for the single-minded case only. We will consider optimal
algorithms for both the general case and some special cases. We will postpone the discussion of
approximation algorithms until later, because we will require a particular kind of approximation
algorithm in this context.
16.8.1 General-Purpose Winner Determination Algorithms
Given single-minded bids {(Si, ˆ vi)}, one straightforward way to solve the winner determination
problem is to solve the following integer program, which uses a binary variable bi to indicate
whether bid i is accepted:
maximize
 
i biˆ vi
subject to
for each s ∈ I,(
 
i:s∈Si bi) ≤ 1
for each i,bi ∈{ 0,1}
The main constraint of this integer program ensures that each item is awarded at most once.
Software packages such as CPLEX can be used to solve such an integer program; since the WDP is
NP-hard, it should come as no surprise that solving integer programs is also NP-hard.Atallah/Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook: Second Edition C820X_C016 Revises Page 10 2009-8-28
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One interesting aside is that in some settings, bids can be accepted partially. For example, if we
have three bids, ({a,b},2), ({a,c},2),a n d({b,c},2), it may be possible to accept half of each bid,
awarding half of a and half of b to the ﬁrst bidder for a value of 1, half of a and half of c to the
second bidder for a value of 1, and half of b and half of c to the third bidder for a value of 1. This
gives us a total value of 3 (we note that if we cannot accept bids partially, then we can obtain only 2).
If accepting bids partially is possible, then we can solve the WDP by modifying the above program
slightly. We make the bi continuous variables, replacing the last constraint by
for each i,0≤ bi ≤ 1
At this point, the program has become a linear program, and linear programs can be solved in
polynomial time (Khachiyan, 1979). However, in the remainder of this chapter we will assume that
it is not possible to accept bids partially.
An alternative approach to solving the general WDP is to write a search algorithm based on
techniques from artiﬁcial intelligence; for an overview of work along this line, see Sandholm (2006).
It should be noted that such algorithms are in many ways similar to algorithms for solving integer
programs.
Yetanotheroptionistousethefollowingdynamicprogrammingapproach(Rothkopfetal.,1998).
For any subset S ⊆ I,l e tw(S) be the maximum total value that can be obtained using only items in
S (that is, if we threw away the items in I − S). Let B(S) be the collection of all proper subsets S  ⊂ S
such that there is at least one bid on exactly S . Then, we have
w(S) = max{max
i
ˆ vi(S),m a x
S ∈B(S)
w(S ) + w(S − S )}
Sincetheoccurrencesofwontheright-handsideinvolvesubsetssmallerthanS,wecanusedynamic
programming to compute w(S) for every subset, starting with the small ones and working our way
up to I—and w(I) gives the maximum value that can be obtained overall. This algorithm runs in
O(n3m)time(wheremisthenumberofitems).Itisstraightforwardtoextendthedynamicprogram
tokeeptracknotonlyofthevaluesthatcanbeobtained,butalsoofthebidsthatneedtobeaccepted
to obtain these values.
16.8.2 Special-Purpose Winner Determination Algorithms
The WDP is NP-hard in general. Nevertheless, if the bids have some structure, then the WDP is
sometimes solvable in polynomial time. For example, suppose that there are only (single-minded)
bidsonpairsofitems(Rothkopfetal.,1998).Certainly,ifmultiplebidsbidonthesamepairofitems,
it never makes sense to accept a bid that is not the highest. Hence, we know the value of pairing any
two given items together for sale (namely, the highest bid for that pair), and the only decision left
is which items to pair together. This is a MAXIMUM-WEIGHTED-MATCHING problem, which
can be solved in polynomial time. (This can easily be extended to also allow for bids on individual
items—for example, by adding dummy items.) Unfortunately, if we allow for bids on sets of three
items, the problem becomes NP-hard (by reduction from EXACT-COVER-BY-3-SETS).
As another example, suppose that the items are arranged as the vertices of a graph, and that every
bid is on a bundle of items that constitutes a connected component in the graph. This is always
possiblebyaddinganedgebetweeneverypairofitems(thatis,makingthegraphacompletegraph),
but we will be interested in restricted classes of graphs. In particular, if the graph is a tree or a cycle,
or, more generally, has bounded treewidth, then the WDP can be solved in polynomial time using
dynamic programming (Sandholm and Suri, 2003; Conitzer et al., 2004). To use a result like this, we
caneithercollectthebidsﬁrstandthenﬁndagraphwithwhichtheyareconsistent,orwecanspecify
the graph beforehand and require all bids to be consistent with this graph. A later result generalizes
this even further by considering hypertree decompositions (Gottlob and Greco, 2007).Atallah/Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook: Second Edition C820X_C016 Revises Page 11 2009-8-28
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There are various other works on structure that bids may have that makes the WDP easier
(Tennenholtz, 2000; Penn and Tennenholtz, 2000; Sandholm and Suri, 2003). Even if the bidders’
valuations are not likely to have the required structure exactly, one possibility is to force the bidders
to only use bids with this structure. This comes at the loss of some economic eﬃciency, because
bidderscannolongerexpresstheirexactvaluations;nevertheless,itisgenerallybetterthanreverting
to single-item auctions.
16.9 The Generalized Vickrey Auction
So far, we have not yet considered how much a winning bidder should pay in a combinatorial
auction. We could simply make such a bidder pay her bid (that is, her reported valuation for the
bundle she won), resulting in a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid combinatorial auction. As in the case of a
ﬁrst-price sealed-bid single-item auction, no bidder would ever bid her true valuation function,
since this would guarantee that even if she wins something, she will have a utility of 0. We recall
that an auction is truthful if revealing one’s true valuation function is always optimal, regardless
of the others’ bids. Can we create a truthful combinatorial auction? A natural approach is to try
to generalize the (truthful) second-price sealed-bid (aka. Vickrey) auction to the combinatorial
setting. There are multiple ways in which one can generalize the Vickrey auction. For example,
one can charge a winning bidder the highest other bid that was placed on exactly the same bundle.
Tosee thatthisisnotagoodidea, considerthefollowingexample. Supposethatthebids are({a},1),
({b},1),a n d({a,b},5), all from diﬀerent bidders. The third bidder would win both items, and this
bidder would pay 0, because nobody else bid on the bundle {a,b}. This intuitively feels wrong, since
there was demand for the items from the other bidders. If the third bidder had bid ({a},5) instead,
she would have had to pay 1; thus, by bidding for more items, the bidder actually pays less! This also
shows that this particular generalization is not truthful: if the third bidder is in fact interested only
in a, she is still better oﬀ bidding on both items, and just throwing b away.
Fortunately,thereisanothergeneralizationthatdoeswork.Let ˆ V bethetotalvalueoftheaccepted
bids.Let ˆ V−ibethetotalvaluethatwouldhaveresultedifihadneverenteredtheauction.(Computing
this requires solving the winner determination problem again, this time without i.) Then, if Si is
the bundle that bidder i wins (possibly the empty bundle), she must pay ˆ V−i − ( ˆ V − ˆ vi(Si)).T h i s
expression is the diﬀerence between how much the other bidders would have valued the allocation
thatwouldhaveresultedifihadneverbeenpresent,andhowmuchtheyvaluethecurrentallocation.
(Forthisreason,itissometimessaidthatipaystheexternalitythatsheimposesontheotherbidders.)
Let us consider the above example with bids ({a},1), ({b},1),a n d({a,b},5). If the third bidder had
not been present, the ﬁrst two bids would have been accepted, so V−3 =2. Hence, bidder 3 pays
2 − (5 − 5)=2. Let us make the example slightly richer, by adding bids ({c},2) and ({a,c},5),
again from diﬀerent bidders. Now, the third and fourth bidders win, for a total value of 5 + 2=7.
Withoutthethirdbidder,thesecondandﬁfthbidderswouldhavewon,foratotalvalueof1+5=6.
Hence, the third bidder must pay 6−(7−5)=4. Without the fourth bidder, again, the second and
ﬁfthbidderswouldhavewon,foratotalvalueof6.Hence,thefourthbiddermustpay6−(7−2)=1.
This way of computing payments is usually called the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA).
It is sometimes also called the Clarke mechanism, or the VCG mechanism [for Vickrey, Clarke,
and Groves (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973)]. (Clarke and VCG refer to generalizations
beyondauctions.)TheGVAhasseveralniceproperties.Forone,itistruthful.Toseethis,wenotethat
bidderi’seventualutilityisvi(Si)−πi =vi(Si)−( ˆ V−i−( ˆ V−ˆ vi(Si)))=vi(Si)+( ˆ V−ˆ vi(Si))− ˆ V−i.It
is impossible for i to aﬀect ˆ V−i; therefore, i can focus on maximizingvi(Si)+( ˆ V − ˆ vi(Si))=vi(Si)+  
j =i ˆ vj(Sj). There is only one way in which this expression depends on i’s bid ˆ vi: her bid aﬀects
the chosen allocation S1,...,Sn.N o w ,i fi had complete control over the chosen allocation (which
she does not, but let us suppose for a second that she does), then she would choose the Sj toAtallah/Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook: Second Edition C820X_C016 Revises Page 12 2009-8-28
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maximizevi(Si)+
 
j =i ˆ vj(Sj).The winnerdeterminationalgorithm,ontheotherhand,chooses the
Sj to maximize
 
j ˆ vj(Sj)= ˆ vi(Si) +
 
j =i ˆ vj(Sj). The only diﬀerence between the two expressions
is that the ﬁrst uses vi,a n dt h es e c o n du s e sˆ vi. But then, if bidder i truthfully reports ˆ vi =vi,t h e
two expressions will be the same, and the winner determination algorithm will choose exactly the
allocation that maximizes i’s utility! Hence, the GVA is truthful.
Averyobservantreadermayhavenoticedthatintheproofoftruthfulness,theonlypropertyofthe
paymentterm ˆ V−ithatweusedisthaticannotaﬀectitwithherbid.Therefore,iftruthfulnessisallthat
we care about, we can replace the term ˆ V−i in the payment expression with any other term that does
not depend on i’s bid. The mechanisms that can be obtained in this way are the Groves mechanisms
(the G in VCG). The GVA mechanism, however, does have some additional nice properties that
not all Groves mechanisms have. For one, it satisﬁes voluntary participation (aka. individual
rationality):abidderneverreceivesnegativeutilityasaresultofparticipatingintheauction,aslong
as she bids truthfully. This is because ˆ V ≥ ˆ V−i (if this were false, it would mean that we had chosen
a suboptimal allocation), and hence vi(Si) − πi =vi(Si) + ( ˆ V − ˆ vi(Si)) − ˆ V−i ≥ vi(Si) − ˆ vi(Si);a n d
the last expression is zero if i reports truthfully. A ﬁnal nice property of the GVA is the nondeﬁcit
(aka. weak budget balance) property: at least as much money is collected from the bidders as is
given to them. In fact, no money is ever given to a bidder. This is because ˆ V−i ≥ ˆ V − ˆ vi(Si)
( ˆ V − ˆ vi(Si) is the value of an allocation that is feasible even when i is not present), and hence
πi = ˆ V−i − ( ˆ V − ˆ vi(Si)) ≥ 0.
16.10 Collusion and False-Name Bidding
The GVA is truthful, so it is not possible for an individual bidder to beneﬁt from misreporting her
valuation function. However, if multiple bidders simultaneously misreport, that is, they collude,
then it is possible that all of them beneﬁt from this. To some extent, this problem occurs even in a
single-item Vickrey auction. For example, suppose that there are three bidders with valuations 1, 3,
and 4. If the third bidder can convince the second bidder not to place any bid, then the third bidder
has to pay only 1 instead of 3. The third bidder may even pay the second bidder 1 for staying out, so
that they each increase their utility by 1 from this. [In general, the colluders need some protocol for
colluding (Graham and Marshall, 1987; Leyton-Brown et al., 2000, 2002), but we will not concern
ourselves with that here.]
Still, there is a limit on what colluders can achieve in a single-item Vickrey auction. For example,
they can never win the item at a price lower than the highest bid by a noncolluder; nor can they
reducetheseller’srevenuebelowwhatthesellerwouldhavemadeifthecolludershadnotparticipated.
Itturnsoutthatinacombinatorialauction,noteventhesepropertiesaretrue.Forexample,consider
a GVA with only two items, a and b. Suppose two bidders have each placed a bid ({a,b},1).I ft h e s e
are the only bidders, then one of them will win, and pay 1. However, let us now suppose that there
are two additional bidders (the colluders): one of them bids ({a},2) and the other bids ({b},2).T h e
colluders then win. How much does each colluder pay? If we remove one of the colluders, then
the other colluder still wins—that is, the remainder of the allocation does not change. Thus, each
colluder (individually) imposes no externality on the other bidders, and hence pays 0. The colluders
beneﬁt from this (assuming they have some value for the items they receive), and the auction’s
revenuehasactuallydecreasedasaresultoftheadditionalbids.MoredetailoncollusionintheGVA
can be found, for example, in work by Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) and Conitzer and Sandholm
(2006).
The same example can also be used to demonstrate a diﬀerent vulnerability of the GVA. Suppose
thattheauctionisruninanopen,anonymousenvironmentsuchastheInternet.Insuchanauction,
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(for example, e-mail addresses). Thus, given two other bids ({a,b},1), a single bidder can place
ab i d({a},2) under one identiﬁer, and a bid ({b},2) under another identiﬁer. As a result, the
“false-name” bidder will win both items, and, as before, the price charged to each bid is 0. Hence,
bidders sometimes have an incentive to bid under multiple identiﬁers; that is, the GVA is not false-
name-proof (Yokoo et al., 2001, 2004).
It should be emphasized that this manipulation cannot be performed simply by submitting
multiple bids under a single identiﬁer [for example by bidding ({a},2) OR ({b},2)]. In this case, to
computethebidder’sGVApayment,wewouldremovethebidder’sOR-bidinitsentirety,sothatthe
resulting payment would be 1. In the example where the bidder uses two diﬀerent identiﬁers, there
would be no problem if we could tell that the two identiﬁers correspond to the same real bidder,
because in that case we would remove both identiﬁers’ bids simultaneously to compute the bidder’s
GVA payment. Unfortunately, it is generally not possible to tell which identiﬁers were created by
the same bidder.
One may wonder whether we can address some of these problems by using a combinatorial
auction mechanism other than the GVA. It has been shown that any mechanism that avoids these
issues (revenue nonmonotonicity, collusion, and false-name bidding) must have some unnatural
properties(Rastegarietal.,2007).Still,severalfalse-name-proofcombinatorialauctionmechanisms
have been designed (Yokoo et al., 2001; Yokoo, 2003; Yokoo et al., 2004). It is also possible to
make the use of multiple identiﬁers suboptimal by verifying the identities of some of the bidders
(Conitzer, 2007).
16.11 Computationally Efﬁcient Truthful Combinatorial
Auctions
Another problem with the GVA is that it requires us to solve the winner determination problem
to optimality. In fact, to compute the GVA payments, we need to solve up to n additional WDP
instances: for each winning bidder, we need to solve the problem again with that bidder omitted.
[It should be noted that at least in some settings, some of the computational work can be reused
across the diﬀerent instances (Hershberger and Suri, 2001).] An obvious idea is to not solve the
WDPtooptimality,butrathertouseanapproximationalgorithmthatreturnsasolutionthatisclose
to optimal. However, this eﬀectively changes the mechanism, and there is no reason to think that
desirable properties such as truthfulness and voluntary participation will continue to hold (Nisan
and Ronen, 2001).
Letusconsiderthespecialcaseofsingle-mindedbidders.Onenaturalapproximationalgorithmis
thefollowing.Sortthebids(Si,vi)byvi/|Si|,theper-itemvalueofthebid,indescendingorder.Then,
considerthebidsinthisorder,andacceptanybidthatcanstillbeaccepted.Forexample,supposethe
bids are, in sorted order, ({a},11),({b,c},20),({a,d},18),({a,c},16),({c},7),({d},6). The algorithm
willaccept the ﬁrst two bids; the next three bids can then no longerbe accepted, because oneof their
items has already been allocated; ﬁnally, the last bid is accepted. The total value of this allocation is
11+20+6=37(whichislessthanthe20+18=38thatcouldhavebeenobtainedbyacceptingjust
the second and third bids). Now, if we wish to calculate the ﬁrst bidder’s GVA payment using this
approximationalgorithm,wemustremovethisbid,andrunthealgorithmagain.Afterremovingthe
ﬁrst bid, the algorithm will actually accept the bids ({b,c},20) and ({a,d},18), the optimal solution.
Hence, the ﬁrst bidder’s (approximated) GVA payment is 38 − (37 − 11)=12. This is more than
the bidder’s valuation! It follows that this approximation of the GVA mechanism does not satisfy
voluntary participation (and hence it is also not truthful, because the bidder would have been better
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However, we can use this approximation algorithm for the WDP to obtain a truthful mechanism
that satisﬁes voluntary participation: we just need to compute the payments somewhat diﬀer-
ently (Lehmann et al., 2002). For each winning bid, consider the ﬁrst bid in the sorted list that was
forced out by this bid. The ratio vi/|Si| for that bid is what the winning bid must pay per item. For
example, in the above instance, the ﬁrst bid forced out by the winning bid ({a},11) is ({a,d},18).
Hence, the bid ({a},11) pays 18/|{a,b}|=9 per item—and since it wins only one item (a), that
means it pays 9. As for the winning bid ({b,c},20), the ﬁrst bid forced out by it is ({c},7) (it is not
({a,c},16), because this bid was already forced out by ({a},11)), so the bid pays 7/|{c}|=7 per item,
and since it wins two items, it pays 14. The ﬁnal winning bid, ({d},6), forces no other bids out and
hencepays0.Giventhatbiddersaresingle-minded,thismechanismsatisﬁesvoluntaryparticipation
and truthfulness (each winning bidder pays the lowest amount that they could have bid while still
winning).
The above approximation algorithm for the WDP has a worst-case approximation ratio of m,t h e
number of items. If we sort the bids by vi/
√
|Si| instead, then the approximation ratio is improved
to
√
m.
There is a signiﬁcant body of work on computationally eﬃcient truthful combinatorial auctions:
see, for example, Nisan and Ronen (2000); Mu’alem and Nisan (2002); Bartal et al. (2003); Archer
et al. (2003); Dobzinski et al. (2006); Bikhchandani et al. (2006); Dobzinski and Nisan (2007a,b).
16.12 Iterative Combinatorial Auctions and Preference
Elicitation
In a perfect world, every bidder would have a valuation function that can be concisely expressed
in the bidding language of the combinatorial auction. Unfortunately, in reality, this is often not
the case. This does not mean that bidders usually submit extremely long bids (such as an XOR
of 2m − 1 bundles): this is too impractical, not only because it requires the communication of an
exponentialamountofinformation,butalsobecausedetermining one’svaluationforagivenbundle
is generally a nontrivial task. Instead, bidders bid on a few bundles on which they think their bids
will be competitive. But they may not know exactly on which bundles they would be competitive,
and if they do not bid on the right bundles, this results in decreased economic welfare.
A potential remedy for this is to, during the auction, give the bidders feedback on how they are
doing in the auction. This means that we must abandon the sealed-bid format, and instead consider
iterative auction mechanisms. We have already seen some examples of iterative auctions in the
single-item context, namely the English, Japanese, and Dutch auctions. For example, in the English
auction, a bidder knows if she is currently winning, and if she is not, she can choose to raise her bid.
The English and the Japanese auctions are ascending auctions.
It turns out that we can also create ascending combinatorial auctions. As an example, let us study
the iBundle ascending combinatorial auction (Parkes and Ungar, 2000). This auction maintains,
for each bidder i,f o re a c hb u n d l eS, a current price pi(S). In each round of the auction, the bidder
is supposed to choose the bundle(s) most attractive to her at her current prices, that is, the set
argmaxS vi(S)−pi(S),andbidpi(S)onthese bundles.Theexceptionisifvi(S)−pi(S)<0forevery
bundleS,inwhichcasethebidderissupposedtodropout.Ifabidderfollowsthisstrategy,sheissaid
to bidstraightforwardly. At the end of the round, the winner determination problem is solved with
the submitted bids. Then, for every active bidder i that is not winning anything, for every bundle
S that she bid on, the price pi(S) is increased by some predetermined amount  . Eventually, there
will be a round where every active bidder wins something, and at this point the auction terminates
with the current allocation and payments. This auction is known to have some nice properties:
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straightforward bidding is an ex-post equilibrium, and the GVA outcome results (Ausubel and
Milgrom, 2002). Informally, buyer submodularity means that the more bidders are already present,
the less having additional bidders adds to the ﬁnal allocation value. Strategies are said to be in
ex-post equilibrium if for each bidder i, it is optimal to follow the strategy, assuming that the other
bidders follow their strategies (but regardless of what the other bidders’ valuations are). Numerous
otheriterativecombinatorialauctionshavebeenproposed[foranoverview,see(Parkes,2006)],and
inherent limitations of this approach have also been studied (Blumrosen and Nisan, 2005).
More generally, the auctioneer can sequentially ask the bidders various queries about their
valuation functions, until the auctioneer has enough information to determine the ﬁnal outcome.
If the ﬁnal outcome is (always) the GVA outcome, then responding truthfully to the auctioneer is
an ex-post equilibrium. This ﬂexible query-based approach is generally referred to as preference
elicitation (Conen and Sandholm, 2001). Common queries include value queries (“What is your
valuationforbundleS?”)anddemandqueries(“Giventheseprices,whichbundle(s)doyouprefer?”).
Demand queries can use either item prices, where the price for a bundle is the sum of the prices
of the individual items, or bundle prices, where each bundle has a separate price (as we saw in
the iBundle auction above). For some restricted classes of valuation functions, it has been shown
that a polynomial number of queries suﬃces to learn a bidder’s valuation function completely (if
we assume that the valuation function lies in that class). For example, a valuation function can be
elicited using a number of (bundle-price) demand queries that is polynomial in the length of the
function’sXOR-representation(LahaieandParkes,2004),thoughingeneralanexponentialnumber
of queries is required if only item prices (and value queries) are allowed (Blum et al., 2004). Various
other results have been obtained on classes of valuation functions that can(not) be elicited using a
polynomialnumberofqueries(Zinkevichet al.,2003; Santiet al.,2004; BlumrosenandNisan,2005;
Conitzer et al., 2005; Lahaie et al., 2005).
Withoutanyrestrictionsonthevaluationfunctions,negativeresultsareknown:forexample,solv-
ingthewinnerdeterminationproblemingeneralrequiresanexponentialamountofcommunication,
regardless of what types of query are used (Nisan and Segal, 2005).
16.13 Additional Topics
Inthisﬁnalsection,wementionafewadditionaltopicsandprovidesomereferencesfortheinterested
reader.
There are several important variants of (combinatorial) auctions, including (combinatorial)
reverse auctions and (combinatorial) exchanges. In a reverse auction, the auctioneer seeks to buy
one or more items, and the bidders submit bids indicating how much they need to be compensated
to provide the items. In an exchange, bidders can act as buyers as well as sellers. While these
variants display some signiﬁcant similarities to regular (forward) auctions, there are also important
diﬀerences (Sandholm et al., 2002).
Quite a few researchers have tried to generalize Myerson’s expected-revenue maximizing auction
to combinatorial auctions; this turns out to be surprisingly diﬃcult (Avery and Hendershott, 2000;
Armstrong,2000;ConitzerandSandholm,2004;LikhodedovandSandholm,2004,2005).Adiﬀerent
takeonthisproblemistodesigncompetitiveauctions,whichobtainarevenuethatiswithinafactor
of the revenue that can be obtained with a single sale price (Goldberg et al., 2006).
A ﬁnal important direction is the design of online auctions. “Online” here does not refer to
Internet auctions; rather, it refers to settings in which the bidders arrive at and depart from the
auction over time, and allocation decisions must be made before all the bidders have arrived. (More
detail can be found in, for example, Lavi and Nisan, 2000; Awerbuch et al., 2003; Blum et al., 2003;
Friedman and Parkes, 2003; Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003; Hajiaghayi et al., 2004, 2005; Bredin and
Parkes,2005;Blumetal.,2006;Babaioﬀetal.,2007;Hajiaghayietal.,2007;ParkesandDuong,2007.)Atallah/Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook: Second Edition C820X_C016 Revises Page 16 2009-8-28
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